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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-\'S. -

GERALD OAKLEY HUGGINS,
Defendant wnd Avpellant.

Case
No.10545

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATE~IENT

OF NATURE OF CASE

The appellant, Gerald Oakley Huggins, was convicted
in the Second .Judicial District Court of Weber County,
State of Utah, of Yiolation of Section 76-7-9, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, alleging that he did wilfully and unlawfull~, take indecent liberties with the persons of two
female children, age six and seven years, without intending or attempting to commit the crime of rape upon
said children.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Upon the trial of the aforesaid case, the defendant
was com·icted hy jury trial and sentenced by the court to
Rene an indeterminate term in the Utah State Prison.
1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant respectfully requests that the· COll\'l(•..
ti on be set aside and the said defendant dis char d.
.
.
ge , 01
m the alternative a new trial be granted.
•

STATEMENT OF F AC'l1 S
The evidence indicated that the def end ant. Gerald
Oakley Huggins, is a married man who on the date 01
the alleged offense resided with his wife and a srnalt
daughter, in Ogden City, Utah.
The alleged victims in this matter resided with thei1
pa.rents next door to the home of the defendant (R. 15).
The testimony of the mother indicated that while
giving her daughters a bath on the 10th day of .July, 1965,
she noticed a redness in the area of the sexual parts or
the girls and questioned them concerning it (R. 20). Thal
the girls then informed her that the defendant ha<l taken
them into the bedroom of his home a short time prior to
the 10th of July, 1965, and had placed his hands ou their
sexual parts (R. 37).
There was also testimony by the mother that an older
brother of the girls, Mike, age 13, had molested the girls
in the past and that the mother had told the girls that if
he did this a.gain he would have to go away and live
elsewhere (R. 23, 26).
On page 36 of the transcript the mother of the chi!·
· t'
dren was allowed by the Court, over obJee
ion, to relatr
2

portion of conversation with the alleged victims in
which the mother testified a third girl, Garthia Walton,
, ge 10 years, is alleged to have told the little girls in1
i.·olved here, that the defendant had molested her as well
(R 36). The Court, in denying the defendant's Motion
for \fistrial, was informed by the District Attorney, that
the charge of indecent liberties, involving the Walton
cirl, hacl been filed the morning of the trial (R. 40). Not·virhstanding the fact that the evidence is clear that the
~tate knew all about the alleged offense involving the
IO-Year old Walton girl from the very inception of the
investig-a tions of this case.
;i

The little girls then testified that the defendant had
molested them, and Garthia Walton was sworn and, over
objection, testified that the defendant had molested her
in substantially the same manner as the two small girls
who \,-ere the subject of this prosecution.
The defendant then took the stand and denied any
kiiowledge of the incident whatsoever.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR
IN ALLOWING THE PROSECUTION TO
OFFER EVIDENCE OF THE COMMISSION
OF OTHER CRIMES BY THE DEFENDANT.
The problem of when and under what circumstances
the prosecution will be allowed to introduce evidence of
other criminal acts is one that has received a great deal
3

of attention from the courts. The general rule 1•8 se t fortL ,
in 22A, C.J.S. at Section 682 as follows:
··

''The general rule is that evidence that a«' ,
h as commi"tte.d ano th er cnme
· mdependent,
·
anduse"
un
~~nected, with the one on trial is inadmissible: ,
it
is not competent to prove one crime by pi·O\.
•
mg another."
In discussing the various reasons for the rule it 113 ,
pointed out that in many incidences evidence of an llii
connected crime would tend to influence the jur1
adversely, and that said influencing of the jury woulri
usually outweigh any probative worth that the evidene1•
may have. It was also pointed out that a defendant i,
entitled to be tried upon one case at a time and that to
force him to defend, in effect, several allegations of
criminal conduct at once was placing an unfair burden
upon the defendant.

It is true there are many exceptions to the general
rule stated above, notwithstanding the existence of these
various exceptions, the general rule denying admissio11
of evidence of other offenses should be strictly enforced
in all cases where applicable, because of the prejudice
and injustice of such evidence, and should not be departed
from except under conditions which clearly justify such
a departure. This rule is set forth in numerous cases as
exemplified by the following: People v. Epping, 162 N~E.
2d 366, 17 Ill., 2d 337 (1959) ; State v. Frizell, 295 P. 6JS,
132 Kan. 261, (1931); State v. Eder, 78 P. N23, 36 Wash.
42, (1904).
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In the cas of State v. Lyle, 118 S.E. 803, 125 S.C. 406,
!1 92 3), the Court stated as follows:

"EYidence of another offense coming within one
of the exceptions 'is yet inadmissible, unless it
mav be considered reasonably necessary in the
light of a.11 the facts of the particular case to
accomplish the purpose for which it is offered.' "
In the recent case of State v. Kazda, 38 P. 2d 407, 14
Ptah 2d 266, (1963), the Court reversed and remanded
for a new trial. A case wherein a defendant was examined hy the prosecutor concerning a conversation that he
had with an FBI agent that related to other offenses not
connected with the one upon which he was being tried.
The Court in reversing stated as follows :

"We deem the foregoing to constitute prejudicial
error. It implied that the defendant was implicated in other crimes, none of them proven, and could
have no other effect than to de·grade the defendant and to give to the jury the impression that
he had a propensity for crime.''
Again, our 0"-"11 Supreme Court in the case of State
'·Dickson, 361 P. 2d 412, 12 Utah 2d 8 (1961), in reversing- and remanding for a new trial a case involving the
questioning of a defendant concerning a prior alleged
nffense of robbery, the Court stated with approval the
i;eneral rule as follows:
"The universally accepted general rule is that
such evidence is not admissible if its effect is
merely to disgrace the defendant or show his propensity to commit crime. However, where evidenee has a special relevancy to prove the crime
of "'hi ch the defendant stands charge, it may be
5

allowed for that purposr; and the fa t th .
c at r
.
.
s h ows anot }1er cnme wdl not render tlw "d
'
1
inadmissible.''
ri enri
The Court further ""<'llt on to stat<' in the Stat, ,

Dickson:

'.'It

is a soun<l and salntory policy of thE· la\\' L
mdnlge e\·<'ryone, inrlnding rom·ietPd frlon~. id!:
the presumption of inno<'enre, and to rrriuirr tJ,
State to obtain and pr<'srnt snffi<·ie11t C'rnlihle
dence to co1ffince the .inry of tht• dt>fPnd:rnt', ~ru 11
of the crime chaq:~ed lw~·ond a rea;;nnahl1· dni:i,
If this wen• not so, sc>rions and perhap!' ir:Hp'"
able ohstacles to reformation an<l rehaliilitatin!.
would exist for a man who had oner acquired a ha1i
reputation.''
In the Utah Supreme Court, in the case of Stat, ,
Winget, :no P. 2d 738, 6 Utah 2d 243, (19±7) the rourt wa'
faced with a similar type situation as the instant case. 11
this case a defendant was charged with the rrime of rapP.
The girl involved was eight years of agr. At the trial !ht
Court, o\·er the ohjections of eounsel, allowed a 1i-WHI"
old step-daughter to testify that some years earlier th1·
defendant had rapPd her while she> residrd in his hom1

1

The Court stated the question as follows:
"The sole question confronting us is wheth1°r thl'
c>videnee of similar sex arts with persons otl~rr
than the eomplaining witness is admissahle. 111·
less we were inclined to revc>rs<' our own <lec1s 11111
in the strikingly similar <'ase of State Y. Willi~m,.
36 Utah, 273, 103 P. 2;,o, whirh we feel romt.rarn e.d
. 1ence is
. ma
. d m1ss1
. "ble rn t111~
not to do, snrh en(
state."

In a concurring opinion in the Winget Case, the Hon.
Wacle, .Justice, reviewed the prior cases of the Utah court
;i!ld summarized the rnles as follows:
'·The following is a brief review of the rules
ahon ref erred to: Except where otherwise pro\·ir1<·d ],,. ru]('s of evidence all relevant evidence is
;1dmissi\)Je. RPle,·ant e,·idence means evidence hav1rg- a tern le11ey in reason to prove or disprove any
makrial facts in issue. However, evidence that
n perc;on ('Ommitted a crime upon one oceasion is
::rndmissible to pro,·e his disposition, bad charJdc·r. or propensity to commit erime as the basis
for a11 infrrenee that he committed the crime for
1d1ich he is on trial, but such evidence when rele,·ant is admissible to prove some other material
ia('t i1)('lucling the absence of mistake or accident,
motin. opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
kuo\\·Jeclgr or identit!·· The reason for excluding
:-::uC'l1 (•,·idl'llC't> is that the danger of prejudice outwei!,d1s the probatin~ ,·alue of such evidence. This
is said to he an application of the rule against the
initial introduction of evidence of bad character by
the pros("('uti1m. Howe,·er, it is generally recognized that the .Judge mav in his discretion exclude
find~ that its probative value
such e,·idenee if
is '>nhstm1tia1ly outw<:'ighed hy the risk that the
a1tmission will ca nse undue consumption of time,
nrate substantial danger of undue prejudice, or
i)f confusing the issues, or misleading the jury or
nnfairlv and harmfully surprise the defendant
''·ho has not had n'asona hle opportunitv to anticipate that such e\·idence woul<l be offe~ed.

Ii«'

"Iu appl,'l·i11g these rulrs to the facts of this casl'
it i« rl<'ar that the 0\·idenre of preYious sexual
relatiOJ1c; hetween thl' defl:'ndant and his stl'pdaug-hter has prohati,·e ,·alue to show the dl'g-nuled eharaeh•r, <lisposition and propensity to
'.'< mmit ~<·xnal <·rimP and in particular tlw crime
1
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there charged. If that is the only maten· 1 f

· th·
·
m
. is case wh.ich sueh evidence
tends to pa ..a~t
. . ad . .bl b
ro,e tt
is m m1ss1 e ecause of the exclusion are

ception to the general rule that all relevant e~.
1
dence is admissible, to the effect that eviden e\ ,·.
another criID:e is i~dmissible if it only show:~~d
ch.aracter, disposition o~ pr?pensity to commit
crime generally or the crime m particular."
Most of the Utah cases as well as most cases from
other jurisdictions involving the question herein. 31.,
cases in which the defendant was cross-examined concen:
ing his prior acts of alleged misconduct. In the instan·
case the State of Utah was asked by the Court at the out
set of the trial to indicate who its witnesses would b~
The Sate did not list the name of Garthia Walton as a
prospective witness (R. 41). The first indication that her
name was involved in any manner oe.curred during th(·
examination of the mother of the children (R. 36). Tlw
additional fact that the State of Utah, although it harl
taken the statement of Garthia Walton at the same timP
tha.t it had taken the statements of the Nelson girls. in
July, of 1965 (R. 105). The State, by the District Attorney, asked the mother of Garthia Walton to sign a Com·
plaint charging the defendant with a similar crime on the
very morning that the instant case came to trial (R.1061
The defendant feels that it is significant the timing of th'
State as to when it decided to prosecute the defendant
on the Walton case. That the timing of the prosecution.
the failure of the State to divulge Garthia Walton, and
the manner in which her testimony was elicited clear!: '
t show hail
indicate an intent on the part of the Sta t e 0
1
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character on the part of the defendant and a propensity
10 commit this type of crime.
In connection with the allowing of testimony of a
,;milar act of misconduct with a separate person, the
Court made the following statement to the jury (R. 81) :
THE

girl!

CouRT : Are you going to call the Walton

DISTRICT ATTORNEY: Yes, your Honor, I intend to
eall the Walton girl.
THE CouRT: The jury is instructed as follows. It
is my belief that the State claims that they will
present another witness, a. little Walton girl, they
say that will allege some misconduct towards her
by this defendant of a similar to that to which he
is here charged with. You are instructed that he
is not here on trial for assault upon the Walton
girl. There is another charge, I believe, filed reg-arding the Walton girl.

BINGHAM:: Your Honor, I will object to this
on the part of the Court and ask a.t this time
for a mistrial.
~fa.

CouRT : Whether there is or isn't, I don't
know, but that is not the trial that is taking place
today. The trial today involves, alleges as to the
two Nelson girls only, so you cannot consider the
Walton girl's testimony as proof of this offense.
You can receive it for a bearing, if any it has on
the question of motive of any person who commits this type of offense here on trial, if you believe this offense is the type of offense that would
be committed by only the smallest minority of
the population because it is of an unusual nature.
In other words something that only an unusual
person would be motivated to do. You cannot
think he may
convict of these offenses because vou
•'
.
THE

9

have. committed
another offense. On the·issue 1_
.
0
mo t ivahon and make-up of a person who ul
0
commit the type of offense charged here i7°~
1
find it to be a highly different type of thing- f~~
that purpose only you can hear the Walton i(irl
All right.
-

It is the contention of the defendant that the Cot::·t
at this point instructed the jury that the Walton g-irt',
testimony was to be utilized by them for two purposh
First, they were to listen to the Walton girl's testimom
of a similar occurrence and determine, with its 3[1L
whether or not the child molesting was an unusual typ1
of occurrence and an occurrence that onlv
. a minoritl ofpersons would commit. Secondly, instruction by tht
Court told the jury they could consider the Walton girl'
testimony as an aid in determining motivation.
'

It is the contention of the def end ant that thiR ir.
struction by the Court was in effect an instruction thal
the jury was to use the evidence of the Walton girl to ,
determine if the defendant is or was a person of a 1Jr..
praved nature.
There is no allegation that the Walton girl's lf''timonv was to aid in establishing the absence of mistake or
accident, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, kno\1':edge or identity. It could not be contended by the·S·t~t~
that the evidence was offered to impeach the credibiht'
. defendant, he had not ta k en th e st an d at thi~
of this
time. The attempt by the Sate to show an unrelateJ:
·fr not ltst111
prior act, between the def end ant an d a pa1 .
.
.
f d t tl1e uecr,s1tY
in the Complarnt, forced upon the de en an
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of attempting to defend himself in connection with accu-

sations involving three children. Needless to say he had
no opportunity to have a Preliminary Hearing on the
Walton girl charge, prior to being forced to defend himsdf in connection therewith.
CONCLUSION
In conrlusion the Court committed error in allowing
il12

evidence of the Walton girl to be submitted to the jury

",;d in the instruction of the Court to the jury in conL\>ction therewith.

Respectfully submitted,
L. G. BINGHAM
1001 First Security Bank Bldg.
Ogden, Utah
Attorney for Appella;n.t

11

